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Article 2

Doran: The Substantial Certainty Exception to Workers' Compensation

THE SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY
EXCEPTION TO WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
MICHAEL DORAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION'

In the wake of the industrial revolution and corresponding
increase in on-the-job accidents, most states swiftly enacted workers' compensation plans.2 North Carolina adopted its Workers'
Compensation Act [Act] in 1929.3 The social policy behind compensation plans is to provide workers with efficient and certain
benefits for work related accidents without requiring the injured
worker to prove negligence or overcome employer defenses such as
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk and the fellow-servant rule. 4 In exchange for these defined, albeit limited, compensation benefits, employees give up their common law right to sue
the employer for negligence. In general terms, the Act provides
the sole and exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course
of employment. 5 These tradeoffs provide the basic compromise
* Michael Doran is a practicing attorney in Salisbury, North Carolina with

the firm of Wallace and Whitley and concentrates in the areas of personal injury,
civil litigation, Woodson claims, and appellate practice. He appeared as
appellate counsel for the plaintiff in the case of Owens v. Deal after the first
decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. He received his BA. from
Davidson College, and J.D. from Wake Forest.
1. Many thanks to Bob Sar and the Editorial Staff of the Campbell Law

Review, who provided invaluable assistance with respect to preparation of the
Introduction to this Article and the research with respect to treatment of this
issue in jurisdictions other than North Carolina, as noted infra part II.D. and
footnotes 180-93.
2. New York passed the first American workers' compensation statute in
1910 and the New York Court of Appeals ruled it unconstitutional as a due
process violation. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). In 1913,
New York passed a second plan which withstood judicial scrutiny. All remaining
states passed similar compensation plans over the next several years. See 1 A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.10 (1984).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-101 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
4. See S. HoRovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 2 (1944).

5. See N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 97-9, 97-10.1 (Supp. 1994); Strickland v. King, 293

N.C. 731, 239 S.E.2d 243 (1977).
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and framework of workers' compensation legislation. The negligent employer enjoys protection from large jury verdicts and the
injured employee enjoys certain recovery for work related injuries.
Over the past several years, North Carolina courts created
three significant exceptions to the exclusivity of Worker's Compensation benefits. In these areas an injured worker can maintain a civil lawsuit for conduct deemed more egregious than mere
negligence. The early Warner v. Leder 6 and Essisk v. Lexington7
decisions made clear that a common law tort action exists for an
employer's intentional injuries.8 Wesley v. Lea 9 extended the
intentional injury exception to those committed by a co-employee.
Explaining the policy behind the intentional injury exception, the
Pleasant10 court stated:
[Slince negligence connotes unconscious inadvertence, allowing
injured workers to sue co-employees would not reduce injuries
caused by ordinary negligence. The same cannot be said in cases
involving intentional torts.... Permitting an injured worker to
bring an action against a co-employee for an intentional tort
places responsibility upon the tortfeasor where it belongs. Since
the commission of an intentional tort includes a constructive or
actual intent to injure, allowing an injured co-worker to sue the
tortfeasor serves as a deterrent against future misconduct."
Reasoning that these same policy reasons should apply to similar
situations, the Pleasant court created the second exception by
extending an injured employee's ability to pursue a civil suit
against his co-employee for willful, wanton and reckless negligence.' 2 The court specifically declined to address "whether an
employer may be sued for similar conduct."' 3 Finally, in August
1991, the North Carolina Supreme Court announced the
landmark decision of Woodson v. Rowland' 4 creating the third,
and most significant exception to the exclusivity of the Workers'
Compensation Act - that of substantial certainty.
Allowing civil recovery outside the Workers' Compensation
Act for injuries which are substantially certain to occur is a logical
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

234, N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952).
232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
See Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 713, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1985).
252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350 (1960).
312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
Id. at 716-17, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
Id.
Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
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progression from the rule that the Act does not preclude recovery
for intentional injuries. Prosser states, "Intent is broader than a
desire to bring about physical results. It must extend not only to
those consequences which are desired but also to those which the
actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what he
does."1 5 This understanding forms the basis of constructive intent
and allows recognition of discernible, differentiated categories of
tortious actions. If the different types of tortious actions are
thought of as a continuum, intentional actions are at the highest
end of the scale progressing next to substantial certainty, then to
willful, wanton or reckless negligence, and finally to mere negligence. 16 Separating these categories, North Carolina defines willful negligence as "the intentional failure to carry out some duty
imposed by law or contract which is necessary to the safety of the
person or property to which it is owed."1 7 The terms wanton and
reckless are synonymous and are defined as "an act manifesting a
reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others."18
By establishing the substantial certainty standard, the Woodson court expressly adopted the views espoused five years earlier
by Justice Martin's dissenting opinion in Barrinov. RadiatorSpecialty Co. 19 During the past four years since the Woodson decision, the courts, both state and federal, have struggled with
application of the substantial certainty standard. This Article
attempts to point toward the correct definition and application of
the substantial certainty liability standard, recognizing its foundation in the Woodson and Barrino decisions. This Article also
will point out the apparent misapplications of the standard in
decisions handed down after Woodson. Finally, in light of the
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th. ed. 1971). See
also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A and cmt. b (1965).
16. "As the probability that a [certain] consequence will follow decreases, and
becomes less than substantially certain, the actor's conduct loses the character of
intent, and becomes mere recklessness.... As the probability decreases further,
and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary
negligence." Id.; see also Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
17. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 714, 325 S.E.2d at 248; see also, Brewer v. Harris,
279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E.2d 345 (1971); Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36
(1929); Bailey v. North Carolina R.R. Co., 149 N.C. 169, 62 S.E. 912 (1908).
18. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 714, 325 S.E.2d at 248; see also, Brewer, 279 N.C.
288, 182 S.E.2d 345; Givens v. Sellars, 273 N.C. 44, 159 S.E.2d 530 (1968);
Bailey, 149 N.C. 169, 62 S.E. 912 (1908).
19. 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986). "Today we adopt the views of the
Barrino dissent." Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
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North Carolina Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Owens v.
W.K Deal Printing,Inc., 2 0 which appears to illustrate the court's
disapproval of the definition and application of substantial certainty contained in decisions from other courts,2 1 this Article will
attempt to forecast the direction of future decisions involving this
theory of civil liability.
II.

DEFINING SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINITY

The Woodson majority 22 held:
[W]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing
it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to
employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the personal representative of the estate in
case of death may pursue a civil action against the employer.
Such misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil
actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions
of the Act.23
Courts, commentators and attorneys have given this oft-quoted
holding the shorthand designation of the substantial certainty
standard. When someone speaks of pursuing a Woodson claim,
they are attempting to prove substantial certainty.
There appear to be four distinct elements necessary to prove
substantial certainty:
(1) Intentional misconduct;
(2) knowledge that the misconduct is substantially certain to
cause serious injury or death;
(3) substantial certainty that the misconduct will result in
serious injury or death to an employee; and
(4) an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct.
It appears that some of the confusion relating to application of the
substantial certainty standard arises from a failure to address
each of these elements separately. Importantly, the distinction
between the first two elements largely creates the difference
between substantial certainty and an intentional tort. The first
element involves express or specific intent to perform an act. The
second element requires subjective knowledge by the actor, knowl20. -

N.C.

-,

453 S.E.2d 160 (1995).

21. Id.
22. Justice Exum wrote for the majority. Justice (now Chief Justice) Mitchell
and Justice Meyer dissented on the creation of the substantial certainty
standard but joined in part of the opinion not related to this issue.
23. Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
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edge which may be inferred from other circumstances, that the
consequences of the act are substantially certain to cause injury.
These two elements connect the intent to act with the injurious
consequences of the act. Blurring the distinction between the first
two elements gives rise to the implication that an intentional tort
must be proved.2 4 The third and fourth elements mandate that an
objective determination assure that the action taken was substantially certain to produce the injury and actual injury results.
A.

Substantial Certainty in the North CarolinaSupreme Court
1.

Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co.

25 formed the basis
Since Justice Martin's dissent in Barrino
for the North Carolina Supreme Court's eventual adoption of the
substantial certainty standard,26 this case should be viewed as a
classic articulation of substantial certainty. For Justice Martin,
the court had to determine "whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant employer in view of evidence put forth by the plaintiff which creates a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the defendant's subjective intent."27 The
plaintiff's factual allegations of the defendant's conduct appear in
the lower court's opinion:
1. covering meters designed to detect dangerous gas and vapor
levels in defendant's plant with plastic bags to render them
inoperative;
2. turning off, on the day of the explosion, alarms designed to
warn of dangerous gas and vapor levels in defendant's plant, and
instructing employees to continue or to resume working despite
the alarms;
3. installing and operating equipment used in storing and handling explosive gas without the inspections and approvals
required by law;

24. Judicial misinterpretation of Woodson has led some courts to the
erroneous conclusion that there is no distinction between substantial certainty
and intentional torts. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Noble Oil Services, Inc., 42
F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1994) (1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34397) (Insurance company not
obligated to defend or indemnify insured for Woodson claim because the
insurance policy excluded coverage for intentional torts.).
25. Barrino v. Specialty Radiator Co., 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986).
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 517, 340 S.E.2d at 305. The majority justices viewed
the issue as "whether the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act provides
the exclusive remedy for an employee injured by the willful, wanton, and reckless
negligence of his employer." Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
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4. using equipment which lacked explosion-proof safeguards to
prevent sparks in an explosion-prone atmosphere in violation of
the National Electrical Code and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of North Carolina; and
5. in general, failing to provide a safe work place.28
From these allegations, Justice Martin stated:
The only reasonable explanation for the corporation's actions in
concealing and dismantling the warning devices is that it intended
for its employees to be subjected to extremely hazardous working
conditions and to the probable consequences of working in such
conditions, including serious injury or death.2 9
Justice Martin saw two primary reasons for denying the
defendant's summary judgment motion. First, as a procedural
matter, summary judgment cannot be granted with material facts
in controversy.30 Under the exceptions to the Act's exclusivity
existing at the time the court confronted Barrino, if the employer
committed an intentional tort, the plaintiff could maintain a civil
suit. 3 1 Since the evidence conflicted as to the defendant's intent, a
genuine issue of material fact existed making summary judgement improper.3 2 Second, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving plaintiff, the evidence shows the "defendant's
deliberate failure to observe even basic safety laws."3 3 Thus, the
plaintiff's injuries were, at the least, substantially certain to
4
He also compared the degrees of culpability between this
occur. 3
situation and that of Pleasant and concluded that since the
defendant's conduct was much more offensive and likely to cause
injury, since the Pleasant plaintiff was allowed to avoid the exclusivity of the Act, surely this plaintiff should also fall outside the
Act. 3 5 In doing so, Justice Martin carefully recognized the differ28. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 69 N.C. App. 501, 503, 3i7 S.E.2d 51,
52.
29. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 518, 340 S.E.2d at 305.
30. See generally, Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 326 N.C.
771, 392 S.E.2d 377 (1990); Hudson v. All Star Mills, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 447 315
S.E.2d 514, discretionary review denied, 311 N.C. 755, 321 S.E.2d 134 (1984)
(summary judgment proper where plaintiff's facts taken as true do not allow
recovery).
31. See generally Pleasant,312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244.
32. Girard Trust Bank v. Belk, 41 N.C. App. 328, 255 S.E.2d 430, cert. denied,
298 N.C. 293, 259 S.E.2d 299 (1979) (issues of intent should rarely be decided by
summary judgment).
33. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 518, 340 S.E.2d at 305.
34. Id.
35. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 521, 340 S.E.2d at 307.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/2
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ence between intent, as shown by substantial certainty, and an
intentional tort.36
The facts contained in Barrino satisfy the substantial certainty test outlined in the Woodson decision when considering
each of the four elements separately. Covering meters with
plastic bags, turning off alarms, installing and operating equipment without the inspections and approvals required by law obviously evidences intentional misconduct. Knowledge of the
substantial certainty of injury arises not only from inference, but
also by the government requirement of safety devices. Moreover,
the safety devices in place, such as meters and alarms, were rendered inoperative by the employer, which again shows subjective
knowledge of the safety hazards. Substantial certainty of injury
appears to arise from using equipment which lacked explosionproof safeguards in an explosion-prone atmosphere. Finally,
injury did in fact occur.
2. Woodson v. Rowland
The plaintiff presented compelling facts in Woodson,7 which
may have necessitated the court to reconsider its ruling in Barrino. A trench cave-in killed the plaintiff's decedent, Thomas
Alfred Spouse, while he worked for Morris Rowland Utility, a construction subcontracting company. 38 At the point of the trench
cave-in, the trench's depth reached fourteen feet and spanned four
feet in width. 9 In the absence of adequate sloping, shoring or
bracing of the trench, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
North Carolina and corresponding safety regulations mandated
36. "For plaintiff to prove that defendant's conduct was intentionally tortious
'does not require a showing that the defendant corporation intended that
plaintiff's daughter would be the particular victim or that death, as opposed to
some lesser harm would be the result." Id.; see also Fallins v. Insurance Co., 247
N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214 (1957).
37. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
38. It should also be noted that the Barrino "majority" was actually a
plurality, with tow Justices concurring on the grounds that the Barrino plaintiff
lost her right to avoid the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act by having accepted Workers' Compensation Death Benefits from the
employer. In Woodson, the plaintiff had not received any Workers'
Compensation benefits at the time the case was presented to the supreme court
for decision.
39. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
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No such safety

place.4"

devices were put in
The court did not engage in a separate discussion of the first
element, intentional misconduct. It can be inferred from the
court's recitation of the facts that the employer's intentional misconduct clearly involved the decision to disregard the safety rules
mandating use of a trench box during the course of the trenching
activities.42 Adding to the offensiveness of the misconduct, Morris
Rowland provided a trench box to the Davidson and Jones subcontractor crew after their supervisor ordered his crew to discontinue
working because the trenches were not sloped, shored or braced
and needed a trench box.4 3 Regarding the second element of the
test, the employer's knowledge, the court stated that the
employer's "state of mind can be inferred." 44 The court summarized the following facts as sufficient to infer knowledge of the substantial certainty that the trench would cave in:
Morris Rowland was capable of discerning extremely hazardous
ditches. His career had been excavating different kinds of soil. He
knew the attendant risks. He had been cited at least four times in
six and one-half years immediately preceding this incident for violating multiple safety regulations governing trenching procedures.
He was aware of safety regulations designed to protect trench diggers from serious injury or death. He knew he was not following
these regulations in digging the trench in question.45
The court also added that the emphatic testimony of Davidson and
Jones' foreman Lynn Craig, that the trench was unsafe and that
he would never put a worker in it, could lead jurors to the conclusion that Morris Rowland shared Mr. Craig's knowledge of substantial certainty.46 The plaintiff presented expert testimony to
show the third element, substantial certainty that the trench
would cave in under the circumstances.4 7 Thus, finding all
requirements satisfied, the court adopted the substantial cer40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-136(g) (1993); 13 N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7E.1400,
cited by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
41. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
42. "Morris Rowland and the project supervisor, Elmer Fry, discussed
whether to use the trench box in their ditch. They decided not to use it. ... " Id.
at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
45. Id. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231-32.
46. Id. at 346, 407 S.E.2d at 232.
47. Id. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/2
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tainty
standard as an exception to the Workers' Compensation
Act. 48
3.

Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc.

The Pendergrass49 plaintiffs, Donald Ray Pendergrass and his
wife, Sarah Pendergrass, brought suit against his employer, Texfli, after serious injuries occurred to his arm while operating a
piece of machinery. 50 The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
intentional misconduct of two co-employees, Gibson and Lake,
rose to a sufficient level to warrant Texfli's vicarious liability
under the wilful, wanton, Pleasant standard. 51 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal,5 2 and the supreme
court affirmed the court of appeasls.5 3
Much of the supreme court's opinion dealt with a factual analysis under the lesser "misconduct standard" announced in Pleasant,54 which requires a showing of "willful, reckless and wanton
negligence of the fellow employees" 55 to avoid the exclusivity bar
of the Act. In holding in favor of the co-employee defendants on
this issue, the court explained:
Although they may have known certain dangerous parts of the
machine were unguarded, we do not believe this supports an inference that they intended that Mr. Pendergrass be injured or that
they6 were manifestly indifferent to the consequences of his doing
5

80.

After determining the allegations of the complaint failed to
establish willful, reckless or wanton misconduct, the court summarily dispensed with the claim against the employer because of
the higher substantial certainty standard involved.5" The court
observed that claims against the employer must involve "conduct
..so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort." 8 Perhaps the court felt compelled to consider inferences of substantial
48. Id. at 334, 407 S.E.2d at 230.
49. Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (1994); 103 N.C. App. 526, 407 S.E.2d 624
(1991).
53. See generally Pendergrass,333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391.
54. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244.
55. Id. at 710, 424 S.E.2d at 246.
56. Pendergrass,333 N.C. at 238, 424 S.E.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 239, 424 S.E.2d 395.

58. Id. at 239, 424 S.E.2d at 395.
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certainty due to a lack of an express allegation in the complaint to
that effect. The court's opinion, however, fails to recognize the distinction apparent in Barrino and Woodson between intentionally
injurious behavior, i.e., substantial certainty, and the Pleasant
wilful, wanton, misconduct standard. Although these three exceptions to the Act can be visualized as a continuum, they are separate theories of liability and must be analyzed independently. 59 A
failure to follow OSHA regulations would appear to satisfy the
intentional misconduct element. Similarly, it is reasonable to
assume that testimony could have been presented to show failure
to follow these regulations was objectively substantially certain to
produce injury. Thus, while not clearly evident in the court's opinion, the plaintiff appears to have stumbled in presenting allegations in the complaint of the employer's subjective knowledge of
the substantial certainty of injury.
B.

Substantial Certainty in the North Carolina Court of
Appeals
1.

Dunleavy v. Yates Construction Co.

The Dunleavy6 ° case has an extensive litigation history. The
complaint was filed prior to the decision rendered in Woodson.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and
the plaintiff appealed. 6 1 The court of appeals affirmed 62 and the
supreme court granted discretionary review solely for the purpose
of remanding the case back to the court of appeals for reconsideration in view of the Woodson decision.6 3 The court of appeals followed suit and remanded "the trial court's order granting
summary judgment for Company ... for a de novo hearing in light
59. While it is difficult to imagine conduct which would generate substantial
certainty liability that is not also willful, wanton or reckless, an independent
analysis of each theory decreases the likelihood of misapplying the standards. In
Pendergrass,the court reasoned that neither willful, wanton or reckless conduct,
nor substantial certainty existed because Gibson and Lake neither intended
injury nor were manifestly indifferent to the consequences of their actions. By
not engaging in a spearate analysis of the substantial certainty test, and by
mentioning that Woodson claims were "tantamount to an intentional tort," the
court appears to have inadvertantly signaled the lower courts that Woodson
claims would be considered and viewed as intentional torts. See infra part III.
60. Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 114 N.C. App. 196, 442 S.E.2d 53 (1994).
61. Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 103 N.C. App. 804, 407 S.E.2d 905 (1991)

(unpublished).
62. Id.
63. Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 330 N.C. 194, 412 S.E.2d 43 (1991).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/2
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of Woodson."6 4 Subsequently, the trial court again granted summary judgment, followed by another appeal.65 The April 5, 1994,
decision rendered by the court of appeals affirmed summary judg6
ment for the defendant employer.
The court determined the plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence of substantial certainty through a factual comparison
with Woodson, rather than by application of the Woodson legal
standard. Judge Johnson, writing for the court, observed:
Some key differences between the facts in Woodson and the
instant case are the following: In Woodson, the employer had been
cited four times in the previous six and a half years for violating
regulations governing trenching safety procedures; in the instant
case, the employer had one previous citation relating to trenching
procedures. In Woodson, the employer was at the job site when the
accident occurred; in the instant case, Robert Yates was not in
town the day of the accident and Douglas B. Yates stopped by the
site briefly the morning of the accident. In Woodson, the general
contractor's foreman working the previous day on a separate
trench that was not sloped, shored or braced, refused to let his
men work until they had a trench box, and yet the employer
ordered his crew to work; in the instant case, employer's foreman,
Mr. Baynes, a man with many years experience in the field,
believed the soil was stable and had no reason to believe otherwise. In Woodson, a trench box was available for use on the day of
the accident and the employer chose not to use it; in the instant
case, the employers had ordered trench boxes for the site but they
had not yet arrived. In Woodson, the employer knew the trench
had a depth of fourteen feet; in the instant case, employer's foreman, Mr. Baynes, had traveled to another part of the job site
believing that the crew would not complete enough work to exceed
a depth of five feet in the trench before he returned. Finally, in
Woodson, the employer consciously, intentionally and personally
ordered the decedent to work in the fourteen-foot trench; in the
instant case, employer's foreman, Baynes, did not consciously,
intentionally and personally order decedent to work in a portion of
the trench which was somewhere between five and eight feet.6 7
64. Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 106 N.C. App. 146, 156, 416 S.E.2d 193,
198, discretionaryreview denied, 332 N.C. 343, 421 S.E.2d 146 (1992).

65. Dunleavy, 114 N.C. App. at 203, 442 S.E.2d at 57. The plaintiff chose not
to pursue any further appeals following the April 5, 1994, decision, according to
plaintiff's counsel.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 201-02, 442 S.E.2d at 55-56.
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Because this case also involved a trench cave-in, it lent itself
to a fact by fact comparison to the Woodson decision. Although
the court presents an accurate factual comparison between the
two cases, factual comparisons lend little to the proper application
of the substantial certainty standard of liability. When taken
away from the legal principles and definitive elements of substantial certainty, the facts of Woodson would never be exactly
matched by another case.
Moreover, the Woodson court pointed to many of the same
facts cited in Dunleavy as evidence of the employer's knowledge of
substantial certainty.68 First and foremost, the Woodson court
felt the experience of the employer's foreman would establish
knowledge: "Morris Rowland was capable of discerning extremely
hazardous ditches. His career had been excavating different kinds
of soil. He knew the attendantrisks "69 Morris Rowland presented
evidence that he and his project supervisor, Elmer Fry, "believed
the soil was packed hard enough so the trench would not cave
in.' 70 Yet, the supreme court expressly held that "[n]either we,
nor later the jury, need accept his characterization of his state of
mind at face value."71
Similarly in Dunleavy, the facts appear to support a finding of
the employer's subjective knowledge of substantial certainty. The
trench digging crew in question was "a new and inexperienced
pipe crew."72 During the afternoon work with the trench, "the
trench was not to exceed five feet in depth."73 Government regulations mandate that trenches exceeding five feet in depth comply
with additional safety procedures.7 4 The defendant had a policy of
using "trench boxes or slop[ing] the sides of a trench when conditions warranted such action, including whenever the depth of a
trench exceeded five feet....-7

Yet, while the digging progressed,

the experienced foreman left the inexperienced crew unsupervised
for such a length of time that the trench depth exceeded five feet
o
at the time of the fatal cave-in. 76 It sestecutatce
seems the court attached too
much importance to the foreman's absence from the work site as
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231.
Dunleavy, 114 N.C. App. at 198, 442 S.E.2d at 54.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 198-99, 442 S.E.2d at 54.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 199, 442 S.E.2d at 54.
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mitigating against Woodson liability when, in fact, the foreman's
absence appears to have been a substantial factor in the misconduct which resulted in the workers' death.
Since the court did not undertake an elemental analysis of
substantial certainty, the court's opinion does not clearly explain
why the plaintiff's claim failed. The result is particularly confusing in light of the summary judgment standard of review presumably applied to the defendant's motion. Perhaps substantial
certainty did not arise because the employer's intentional misconduct was simply the act of leaving an inexperienced crew
unsupervised and the mere lack of supervision was not substantially certain to cause serious injury or death. Perhaps the fact
that the trench exceeded five feet in depth was unintentional,
amounting only to ordinary negligence. It would appear irrefutable, however, that vertical trenches exceeding five feet in depth
are substantially certain to cave-in and cause serious injury or
death, in view of the extensive safety regulations and the
employer's own workplace safety rules, as discussed in Dunleavy.
Examining the facts through the lens of legal analysis produces a more satisfying resolution to the problem. Ordering
trench boxes shows the foreman's knowledge of their necessity.
Allowing work to proceed without the trench boxes, in violation of
government regulation and company policy satisfies the knowledge and objective substantial certainty elements. Injury
occurred. The main weakness in the plaintiff's claim appears to
be whether the employer intentionally, or through mere inadvertence, allowed the trenching to progress without supervision or
safety measures after the trench exceeded five feet.
2.

Powell v. S & G Prestress Co.

On April 19, 1994, the court of appeals published its decision
in Powel177 just two weeks after handing down Dunleavy. The
plaintiff's decedent, Timothy Powell, died on his second day on the
job after being crushed under the wheels of a slow-moving crane
used at the work site.78 S & G Prestress had hired fifteen temporary employees, including Mr. Powell. 79 All temporary employees
received a hard hat and safety glasses, but none of them received
safety training nor the company's safety manual.8s Mr. Powell's
77. Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 442 S.E.2d 143 (1994).
78. Id. at 322, 442 S.E.2d at 145.
79. Id. at 321, 442 S.E.2d at 144.

80. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995

13

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 2

426

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:413

job assignment placed him in a work space where a crane, with no
tire guards, passed within 36 inches of his body, frequently behind
his back."' Although the crane had a warning alarm to provide
notice to workers of its movement, the alarm did not ring loud
enough to be heard in the work space.8 2 Plaintiff's evidence
showed the work site violated industry safety standards.8 3 After
the accident, the North Carolina Department of Labor cited the
employer for violations of several regulations and imposed fines
totaling $ 1,540.84 Prior to this accident, the government had
twice cited the defendant for violating safety regulations.8 5 The
trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and
the court of appeals affirmed. 6
As part of the factual showing at the summary judgment
hearing, plaintiff presented an affidavit from an apparent expert
in the crane industry, which stated in relevant part:
[M]y conclusion is that the procedures and practices that were
being followed by Prestress violated industry-wide standards
regarding operation of cranes in proximity to workers; that new
and inexperienced workers were placed into a work environment
that was unsafe even for experienced personnel, that Prestress did

not observe such common industry rules such as maintaining clear
passage and aisle ways in obstructed fashion, and that Prestress
did not maintain barriers between dangerous machinery, i.e.,
cranes and its workers working within 36-40 inches of same, and
thereby created an extremely and exceedingly high likelihood that
the crane would come into contact with the workers and based
upon the facts that existed, such was substantially certain to
occur. .

..

81. Id. at 329, 442 S.E.2d at 149.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 323, 442 S.E.2d at 146. Two violations were under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-129(1) (1993), for failing to furnish employees conditions of employment and
a place of employment free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or
serious injury. In sum, S & G Prestress received four citations, three of which
were serious in the court's view. Id.
85. In 1979, for failing to provide a railing and footwalk on a crane under 29
C.F.R. § 1910.179(d)(2) and (3) and 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1). In 1983, for failing
to provide for a minimum clearance of ten feet between the top of a crane and a
power line under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.180(j)(I). The 1983 violation caused the death
of an employee. Powell, 114 N.C. App. at 323-24, 442 S.E.2d at 146.
86. Id. at 321, 442 S.E.2d at 144. Judge Wynn dissented.
87. Id. at 324, 442 S.E.2d at 146 (emphasis added).
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Notwithstanding the expert opinion of substantial certainty, the
court focused on the second element, the employer's subjective
knowledge, and found the evidence to be lacking."" The court
determined the defendant did not know its conduct was substantially certain to cause injury by applying the "bomb throwing"
illustration contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
Restatement provides:
A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A
knows that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to
injure C, but knows that this act is substantially certain to do so.
C is injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an
intentional tort.8 9
As noted by Judge Wynn, using this illustration to define the
Woodson substantial certainty standard sets "a higher standard
than that actually applied by the Court in Woodson."90 Although
the Woodson court cited to the Restatement, it did not expressly
adopt the bomb throwing definition for substantial certainty.9 1 In
fact, the Woodson court made no reference at all to the bomb
throwing illustration.
3.

Mickles v. Duke Power Co.

On August 2, 1994, the court of appeals decided Mickles v.
Duke Power Co. 92 The court again referenced the Restatement's
bomb throwing illustration as defining the Woodson substantial
certainty standard. 9 3 However, the court went on to unanimously
hold plaintiff's evidence sufficient to survive summary
94
judgment.
In Mickles, plaintiff's decedent died when he fell approximately 100 feet from a large electric transmission tower while
employed by Duke Power. 95 At the time of the fall, Mr. Mickles
was secured to the tower by a body belt and a pole strap, but had
no backup safety device. 9" Evidence attributed the fall to a phe88. Id. at 326, 442 S.E.2d at 147.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A illus. 1 (1965); see also Powell, 114
N.C. App. at 325, 442 S.E.2d at 147.
90. Powell, 114 N.C. App. at 328, 442 S.E.2d at 148.
91. Id.

92. 115 N.C. App. 624, 446 S.E.2d 369 (1994).
93. Id. at 627, 446 S.E.2d at 372.
94. Id. at 633, 446 S.E.2d at 375.
95. Id. at 325, 446 S.E.2d at 370.

96. Id.
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nomenon known as 9"roll
out," the disengagement of a safety snap
7
from the body belt.
The Mickles facts seem as compelling as those in Woodson
with respect to the second element of the claim, the employer's
knowledge. The power industry clearly recognized the danger of
"roll out."98 Duke Power had experienced at least two prior incidents of "roll out" resulting in the death of one worker in 1975 and
rendering another worker a paraplegic in 1990. 99 Mr. Mickles fell
to his death just eleven months after the last Duke Power "roll
out."10 0 Furthermore, Duke Power's investigative reports of the
earlier incidents "indicate that company officials were aware of
the danger posed by the possibility of roll out." 10 1 Duke Power
went so far as to notify manufacturers of the equipment of the
problems with the body belt10 and
pole strap, but continued to pro2
vide them to their workers.
Perhaps the most damning evidence of employer knowledge
was the memorandum sent to Duke Power's legal department by
John Francis, Duke Power's Manager of Health and Safety
Affairs. The memorandum was issued shortly after the 1990 accident and it also appears to supply sufficient evidence of intentional misconduct. The court summarized the memorandum as
follows:
Francis expressed his opinion that roll out was caused by a size
incompatibility between the D-ring and safety snap. He also
observed that body belt and safety snaps made by different manufacturers might be incompatible. Despite these observations,
Francis stated that an additional safety device known as a fall
arrest system 'may not be the way to go.'... According to Francis'
memorandum: (1) this would be the same thing as telling linemen
that roll out was a 'recognized hazard'; and (2) such a position
would be in direct conflict with what Duke Power and other utilities had argued
during the development of certain OSHA safety
03
regulations.'
The opinion goes on to reference other damaging facts showing Duke Power's intentional misconduct and extensive knowledge, which appears to be overkill in view of the safety director's
97. Id. at 626, 446 S.E.2d at 371.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 628, 446 S.E.2d at 372.
at 628, 446 S.E.2d at 372.
at 625, 446 S.E.2d at 370.
at 628, 446 S.E.2d at 372.
at 630, 446 S.E.2d at 372-73.
at 629-30, 446 S.E.2d at 373.
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memorandum. Duke Power's decision to film a safety movie the
day of the accident covering Mr. Mickles' crew added irony to the
employer's knowledge of the danger.1 1 4 Given these tragic events,
the court reasoned that, at the least, there was a conflict in the
evidence as to each element of substantial certainty to deny the
defendant's summary judgment motion.
4.

Echols v. Zarn, Inc.

In Echols, 10 5 the plaintiff, Cynthia Echols, was injured when
a molding machine crushed her hand as she reached under a
safety gate to remove a plastic part. 106 Plaintiff brought suit
against Zarn alleging substantial certainty.1 0 7 She also alleged
that the willful, wanton and reckless conduct of her supervisor,
Edith Barnett, entitled her to recovery under the Pleasant exception to the Act.10 ' On September 30, 1994, the court of appeals
of summary judgment for the
affirmed the trial court's issuance
10 9
defendants on both theories.

Plaintiff stated that Zarn assigned her to operate a molding
machine that she did not know how to operate. 110 Zarn's supervisor, Edith Barnett, instructed plaintiff how to operate the machine
after plaintiff experienced a great deal of difficulty. 1 ' Plaintiff
contended that Barnett demonstrated and instructed her to reach
under the safety gate, rather than opening the safety gate, to
remove plastic parts." 2 The defendant's Vice President of Human
Resources, who was also the head of Zarn's safety committee, testified in her deposition that reaching under the safety gate violated company safety rules."11 The defendant disputed plaintiff's
evidence as to the nature and extent of Barnett's instructions and
104. Id. at 631, 446 S.E.2d at 374.
105. Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 364, 448 S.E.2d 289 (1994).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 367, 448 S.E.2d at 291. This case has particular significance
because of Judge Greene's partial dissent on the Pleasantmisconduct allegation.
Although Judge Greene determined no substantial certainty claim existed, he
felt plaintiff's evidence raised a jury question against the supervisor as willful,
wanton or reckless conduct. Id. at 378, 448 S.E.2d at 297.
110. Id. at 367, 448 S.E.2d at 291.
111. Id. at 367-68, 448 S.E.2d at 291.
112. Id. at 368, 448 S.E.2d at 291.
113. Id. at 369, 448 S.E.2d at 292.
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offered evidence of written
safety rules which prohibited bypas1 14
sing the safety devices.

Since plaintiff brought suit against Barnett alleging a claim
under Pleasantalong with the substantial certainty claim against
Zarn, the court addressed the claim against Barnett under the
lesser standard first." 5 While the court considered the evidence
sufficient to show negligence on the part of Barnett, the court felt
that the negligence was less egregious than the facts presented in
Pendergrass.16 However, the court engaged in a thorough and

helpful analysis of what behavior constitutes willful, wanton and
17
reckless behavior."

Turning to the substantial certainty claim, the court principally followed the analysis set forth in Powell v. S & G Prestress
Co., "8 including reliance on the Restatement's bomb throwing
example." 9 The court concluded that the evidence against the
employer was insufficient to demonstrate intentional misconduct
because "there is no evidence that anyone employed by Zarn
directed plaintiff to place her hand into the mold area." 2 0 The
court also relied upon the absence of a breach of government regulations to support its conclusion. Since the court did not break
down its reasoning into the elements required for substantial certainty, it is unclear how the absence of breaking government laws
impacts Woodson liability. If the plaintiff's allegations are true,
the company
knowingly violated internal rules and safety
12 1
policies.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 371-77, 448 S.E.2d at 293-96.
116. Id. at 376, 448 S.E.2d at 296.
117. Id. at 371-76, 448 S.E.2d at 293-96.
118. 114 N.C. App. 319, 442 S.E.2d 143 (1994).
119. Echols, 116 N.C. App. at 378, 448 S.E.2d at 297.
120. Id. at 380, 448 S.E.2d at 298.
121. '[Pllaintiff's evidence in its most favorable light tends to show that Zarn
adopted the safety rule that 'only authorized mechanics and maintenance
personnel may reach around or otherwise bypass a safety guard when working
on machinery or equipment' and that Zarn knew of the practice of supervisors

training employees to reach under the safety gate to retrieve the products that
had fallen out of the mold." Id. at 379, 448 S.E.2d at 298.
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C. Substantial Certainty in the Federal Courts
1.

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Noble Oil Services, Inc.

In Travelers,122 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the district court's decision affirming judgment on the pleadings
for the defendant, Travelers Insurance Company. 123 Russell
Wayne Matthes, an employee of Noble Oil Services, Inc., brought
a state court action against his employer based upon a Woodson
substantial certainty theory of recovery after being injured in a
truck explosion.1 24 Noble Oil notified its insurer, Travelers Insurance Company, of the claim and asked that the insurer defend and
indemnify Noble Oil from the prospective liability arising from the
lawsuit. The Travelers' insurance policy contained an exclusion
from coverage for "bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by [Noble]."12 Travelers filed a declaratory judgment
action essentially seeking to enforce the exclusion. The district
court granted judgment on the pleadings for Travelers holding
that the policy's intentional injury exclusion relieved Travelers of
26
1
the duty to defend or indemnify Noble under the policy.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclusion
that "in order to allege a cause of action under Woodson and circumvent the workers' compensation law the plaintiff must neces1 27
sarily allege that the injury as well as the act was intentional."
In so holding, the court quoted one portion of the Woodson
decision:
One who intentionally engages in conduct knowing that particular
results are substantially certain
to follow also intends the results
128
for purposes of tort liability.

This analysis, like that of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
the Powell, Mickles and Echols cases, treats the substantial cer122. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Noble Oil Serv., Inc., 42 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1994),
released in ful-text at No. 94-1598, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34397 at *1. This is a
per curiam, unpublished opinion. Pursuant to the Rules of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, "[clitation of this Court's unpublished decisions . . . is

disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the
law of the case." FED. R. App. P. 36.
123. Travelers, at *1.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at *4.
127. Id. quoting Memorandum of Decison at 7.
128. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 229 (emphasis added); see also
Travelers, at *3.
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tainty test as an intentional tort standard. This is particularly
clear when considering the wording of the exclusion contained in
the Traverlers' policy: "bodily injury intentionally caused." Yet,
the whole point of the Woodson decision is that intent to injure is
not necessary for purposes of substantial certainty tort liability. 129
The substantial certainty of injury, notwithstanding the absence
of intent to injure, produces Woodson liability and an exception to
the Act's exclusivityj provisions. Stated otherwise, an injury
which is substantially certain to occur is nonetheless an unintended injury.
2.

Zocco v. United States

The plaintiff, Scott Zocco, originally framed his suit as a negligence action against Zocco's employer, Lawrence Brawely, who
had not procuredworkers' compensation insurance for his employees, and the general contractor, Deggeller Attractions, who hired
Brawley. 130 The United States Army hired Deggeller to operate
the 1988 Fair at Fort Bragg Army Base in Fayetteville, North
Carolina.' 3 1 Deggeller hired Brawley as a subcontractor to operate two rides. 13 2 Brawley hired Zocco, who was seventeen years
old at the time, to work on the rides. 1 33 During the course of tightening the bolts on a ride, part of the ride bumped Zocco and caused
him to fall through a canvass tarp onto the asphalt pavement ten
13 5
feet below.'33 The accident produced serious injury to Zocco.
Defendant Deggeller raised the defense of the Workers' Compensation Act contending that it was Zocco's "statutory employer"
because it provided workers' compensation insurance covering
Brawley's employees and it had not required Brawley to procure
such insurance. 1 36 The trial court initially denied summary judgment because a material issue of fact existed as to whether Deggeller's workers' compensation carrier provided coverage for
Brawley's employees.' 3 7 By the time the matter came on for trial
in February 1992, the insurer acknowledged coverage for Zocco's
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Woodson, 329 N.C. at 330, 407 S.E.2d at 222.
Zocco v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 595 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 598. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (Supp. 1994).
Zocco, 791 F. Supp. at 597.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/2

20

1995]

Doran: The Substantial Certainty Exception to Workers' Compensation
SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY EXCEPTION

injuries and the trial court decided to reconsider the summary
judgment motion rather than proceed with trial.'38 Upon reconsideration, the trial court determined that Deggeller was Zocco's
'statutory' employer for purposes of the Act, and dismissed the
negligence claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 39 Zocco

sought to preserve his civil remedy by contending his injury fell
within the substantial certainty exception recently established in
granted Deggeller's summary judgWoodson.14 0 The trial court
14 1
ment motion on this issue.

The court determined that a Woodson claim did not lie
against Deggeller because the "forecast of evidence is wholly
insufficient that Deggeller knew that serious injury or death was
substantially certain to result....-4 2 Zocco alleged that the ride
he was working on did not comply with federal safety regulations
and that Deggeller knew of this defect. 14 3 Further, Zocco relied
upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-111.1 to provide a presumption of substantial certainty:
[A]lthough most amusement devices are free from defect and operated in a safe manner, those which are not impose a substantial
probability of serious and preventable injury to the public.44
The court did not engage in an elemental analysis of substantial
certainty, instead concluding that the evidence was "wholly insuf145
ficient" in comparison to the facts contained in Woodson.

It

appears the court felt that the fact that Deggeller received neither
notice nor warning of any type of safety violation presented an
insurmountable barrier to establishing knowledge of substantial
certainty. The court stated that a legislative presumption of "subwas not sufficient to show substantial cerstantial probability"
146
tainty of injury.

138. Id. at 599.
139. Id. at 603.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 604.
142. Id.
143. The alleged regulatory breach was the failure to comply with 29 C.F.R.
Part 1910.23(c) which provides that every platform four feet or more above
ground level be guarded by railing. The ride was nine to ten feet above the
ground and did not have a railing. Zocco, 791 F. Supp. at 603.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-111.1 (1994).
145. Zocco, 791 F. Supp. at 603-04.
146. Id. at 604.
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Hodge v. Weyerhaeuser Co.

In Hodge,'147 the employee-plaintiff, Donald Wayne Hodge,
was seriously injured when he fell from the sixth floor through a
chute which had been covered with plastic. 14 A supervisor
directed the covering of the chutes but Hodge had no knowledge of
their presence. 149 As a result of the accident, the employer
received a citation for a serious violation from the North Carolina
Department of Labor Division of Occupational Safety and Health
for either failing to adequately cover the chute openings or failing
to provide safety belts and life lines to employees required to work
above the chutes.' 5 0 Hodge filed suit alleging substantial certainty against his employer, Southeast Technical Coating, and the
owner of the premises, Weyerhaeuser Corporation.' 5 1 Southeast
moved for summary judgment and the trial court, denied the

motion. 152
The court engaged in a factual comparison between Woodson
and Hodge's claim rather than discuss the four elements of substantial certainty and, instead, identified four "Woodson factors"
to be considered:
1. prior OSHA violations;
2. testimony from a supervisor of another company at the work
site that the work arrangements were unsafe;
3. presence of the employee's supervisor at the work site with the
opportunity to observe the safety hazards; and
workers perform
4. an express direction by the employer that the
53
1
procedures.
safety
required
without
their job
The court found the first two "Woodson factors" absent because
the employer had not previously been cited for OSHA violations
and no "independent supervisor" gave testimony that the work
area was unsafe.15 4 However, the court found the other two
"Woodson factors" present because Southeast's supervisor was
present at the work site with an opportunity to observe the safety
147. Hodge v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 91-125-CIV-4-H, 1993 WL 122307 at *1
(E.D.N.C. March 22, 1993).
148. Id.
149. Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *3.
at *1.
at *3-4.
at *3.
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hazards and the employer directed workers to proceed without

required safety procedures.' 5 5 From this, the court concluded:
[T]wo factors from Woodson favor Southeast and two factors favor
the plaintiff. Combining the evenly divided Woodson factors with

a view of the record as a whole which is most favorable to the
plaintiff, the court finds it must deny Southeast's motion for summary judgment. The court notes that Bragg, Southeast's supervisor, was aware of the safety violations... and that an OSHA

report stated that death was the likely consequence
of a fall such
56
as the one experienced by the plaintiff.'
While this was an improper analysis relying too heavily on
factual matching, the same result appears justified when considering the elements required for substantial certainty. First,
regarding intentional misconduct, the opinion states "[tihe chutes
were covered with the plastic at the direction of Southeast's supervisor of the Weyerhaeuser job, Larry Bragg. 15 7 This violated
safety regulations. Second, employer knowledge can be inferred
from the employer's presence at the job site. 158 Mr. Bragg "was
aware of the safety violations at the Weyerhaeuser site ....
Third, regarding substantial certainty of serious injury or death,
the court found it unnecessary to rule on the admissibility of
expert opinion testimony submitted by plaintiff in the form of an
affidavit and found, instead, that "an OSHA report stated that
death was the likely consequence of a fall such as the one experience by plaintiff."160 As to the fourth element, "[p]laintiff fell
approximately seventy feet down the chute and sustained fractures of his hip, leg and jaw. As a result, he is totally disabled." 16 1

4. Mitchell v. Perdue Foods, Inc.
In Mitchell'162 an uncovered moving chain on a machine
struck plaintiff as she worked. 163 Plaintiff filed suit against her
employer alleging substantial certainty. The defendant, Perdue,
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. at *1.
158. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 330, 407 S.E.2d at 222.
159. Hodge, at *2.

160. Id. at *3.
161. Id. at *1.
162. Mitchell v. Perdue Foods, Inc., No. 3:93 CV 00014, slip op. (M.D.N.C. May
14, 1993).

163. Id. at 2.
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12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court granted
64
the motion.1
The machine ordinarily had a guard covering the fast moving
chain, but the guard was "missing" on the day of plaintiff's
injury.'6 5 The accident occurred as she braced against the
machine to stabilize herself as she reached down to pick up three
chickens that had fallen on the floor, 166 Plaintiff's hand did not
come in contact with the chain while she was operating the
machine. Four days prior to the accident, state inspectors cited
Perdue for a lack of a safety guard on the very same machine that
67
1
caused the injuries.

The trial court began its analysis by considering the first two
Woodson elements separately. The court found intentional misconduct present by the fact that the company received a safety
violation four days earlier for lack of a guard and had not corrected this violation. 168 These facts also established the second
element of the claim: "that defendant knew of the dangerous situation. " 1 6 9 However, the trial court then determined that the spe-

cific mechanism or act producing the injury - reaching over to pick
chickens off the floor and bracing against the machine - was a random act.170 As such, the court determined that the employer could
not have been substantially certain that such a random act would
occur. 17 1 The court buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that

72
there were no random acts in Woodson. 1
This "random act" analysis appears to depart from a proper
application of the substantial certainty standard. While there
may not have been any random acts involved in Woodson, there
certainly were in Barrino.73 In Barrino,a spark set off the explosion. 1 74 It appears the court would have reached a different conclusion had the Plaintiff been injured while operating the machine
or had the court considered the facts in Barrino.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986).
Id.
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5. Reed v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
In Reed,175 while plaintiff attempted to clear a "plug-up" of a
running machine, the machine caught and mangled her leg. Subsequently, she brought suit alleging substantial certainty and the
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Plain"plug-up"
tiff presented evidence that she attempted to clear 1the
76
in the manner by which her employer had ordered.
The trial court engaged in factual comparison, rather than
separately reviewing the substantial certainty elements.177 Furthermore, the court classified the claim as "an intentional tort as
defined by the narrowly construed Woodson exception."1 78 The

court stated the key facts as:
[P]laintiff and other employees had safely used the same procedure to clear plug-ups many times before plaintiff's injury ...
Defendant has established that it has not been cited for safety violations relating to its dryers during the 10 years of operation of the
facility in which plaintiff worked. No other employee of defendant
the
has been injured while attempting to clear a plug-up 1using
79
procedure plaintiff was using at the time of her injury.
From the court's discussion, it is difficult to determine
whether the employer engaged in any intentional acts of misconduct - the first element of substantial certainty. However, the
opinion only notes selected portions of the plaintiff's expert witness' deposition. None of these excerpts include an opinion that
the procedure for clearing plug-ups, as described by plaintiff, was
hazardous or that it violated any safety regulations. None of the
excerpts include an opinion that the procedure followed was substantially certain to cause serious injury or death.
In similar fashion as the Mitchell court, the court concluded
its discussion with a method for distinguishing these facts from
those in Woodson, the "intervening act" analysis:
Plaintiff's expert further testified that there are five ways a dryer
operator could be injured while clearing a wood jam in the
described manner... All five of these situations require an interveing event. A Woodson claim does not rely on an intervening
event. In Woodson, the employee merely entered a trench that
175. Reed v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 93-341-CIV-5-BR, slip op. (E.D.N.C.
April 22, 1994).

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4-7.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Id.
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was so inherently dangerous that it collapsed without any intervening event.18 0

This clearly misapplies the substantial certainty standard when
considering Barrino. In Barrino, the spark causing the explosion
obviously constitutes an intervening event. Moreover, the creation of the spark did not involve intentional misconduct on the
part of the employer.
D.

Substantial Certainty in Other States

States have taken several different approaches to resolving
whether the substantial certainty standard falls outside the exclusivity of workers' compensation legislation. A majority of states
1 83
Pennsylvania,18 4
such as Idaho,18 ' Illinois, 8 2 New Mexico,
South Carolina,18 5 Utah, 8 6 and the District of Columbia l 7 simply
refuse to adopt substantial certainty as an exception to exclusivity.1 88 Indiana, 8 9 Louisiana, 90 Mississippi,19 ' and New
180. Id. at 8.
181. See Kearney v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171 (Idaho 1988).
182. See Bercaw v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
183. See Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc. v. Barnes, 847 P.2d 761 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993).
184. See Barber v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 555 A.2d 766 (Pa. 1989).
185. See Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64 (S.C. 1993).
186. See Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah 1989).
187. See Grillo v. National Bank, 540 A.2d 743 (D.C. 1987).
188. Professor Larson agrees with the majority approach and argues:
[Common law liability] cannot, under the almost unanimous rule, be
stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton,
willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable or malicious
negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short
of a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting
an injury.
2A A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 13-11 (1988). In the
majority of states, Larson explains:
A complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, must do more than merely
allege intentional injury as an exception to the general exclusiveness
rule; it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about
injury.
Id. at 13-46.
189. See Brown v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 803 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. Ct. App.)
(applying Indiana law).
190. See Jasmin v. HNV Cent. Riverfront Corp., 642 So.2d 311 (La. Ct. App.
1994).
191. See Pester v. David New Drilling Co., 642 So.2d 344 (Miss. 1994).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/2
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Jersey, 1 9 2 consider substantial certainty as another way of proving an intentional injury rather than a distinct and separate
exception to exclusivity. Alabama allows suits against co-employees under the substantial certainty standard. 1 9 3 Although not
unique in judicial reasoning,19 4 North Carolina appears to be the
only state to continue applying the substantial certainty standard
as an independent ground for liability.
III.

SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY,

1995 AND BEYOND

In the recent case of Owens v. W.K. Deal Printing,Inc., 19 5 the
North Carolina Supreme Court took the opportunity to briefly
19 6
expound upon a per curiam reversal of the court of appeals.
Apparently intent to set the record straight as to how to define
and apply the Woodson standard of liability, the court stated:
We reemphasize that plaintiffs in Woodson actions need only establish that the employer intentionally engaged in misconduct and
that the employer knew that such misconduct was 'substantially
was
certain' to cause serious injury or death and, thus, the conduct
'so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort. '19 7
This clarification cannot be understated because it reinforces the
wisdom of an elemental approach to judging substantial certainty.
While North Carolina may be unique in its treatment of substantial certainty, there can be no doubt that this basis for liability
exists separately and distinctly from the exceptions for intentional
torts and willful, wanton or reckless negligence. A plaintiff falls
under the Woodson exception if he proves: (1) intentional miscon192. See Bustamante v. Tuliano, 591 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
In Bustamante, the court stated that "it may help to perceive 'substantial
certainty' not so much as a substantive test itself nor as a substitute for a
subjective desire to injure, [but] as a specie of evidence that will satisfy the
requirement... that 'deliberate intention' be shown." Id. at 698.
193. See Layne v. Carr, 631 So.2d 978 (Ala. 1994) (statute allows suit against
co-employees for 'willful conduct' which is defined to include substantial

certainty).
194. Courts in Ohio and West Virginia agreed that substantial certainty stood
as an exception to exclusivity of their statutes but were subsequently overruled
by their legislatures. See, e.g., Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265
(4th Cir. 1986); Kunker v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 522 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio
1988).

195. -N.C. -, 453 S.E.2d 160 (1995) (per curiam).
196. See Owens v. W.K Deal Printing, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 324, 438 S.E.2d 440
(1994).
197. Owens at -, 453 S.E.2d at 161 (citing Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333
N.C. 233, 239, 424 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1993)) (emphasis added)..
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duct; (2) employer knowledge of substantial certainty; (3) substantial certainty in fact; and (4) injury or death.
After the supreme court's Pendergrass19 8 decision, a trend for
analyzing substantial certainty claims emerged in the court of
appeals which focused almost exclusively on factual comparisons
with Woodson, rather than by application of the substantial certainty doctrine. Federal court decisions have employed a variety
of interpretations of the Woodson decision. Most noteworthy is
the Travelers Ins. Co. V. Noble Oil Services, Inc.1 9 9 case due to the
express equation asserted between substantial certainty and
intentional torts and the implications for both employers and
employees under the court's holding precluding the insurance
company's liability. Other federal courts adopted several "buzz
word" tests, such as the "intervening act" analysis in Reed v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,200 the "random act" test in Mitchell v. Perdue
Foods, Inc., 20 1 and the "Woodson factors" balancing rationale of
202
Hodge v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
Most recent cases have transcended to yet a new, higher standard than that actually created in Woodson by confusing and classifying plaintiff's claims as "intentional torts,"2 °3 stating that
Woodson claims are "tantamount to intentional torts,"20 4 and
reciting the "bomb throwing" illustration set forth in the Restatement. 20 5 In this respect, Powell v. S & G Prestress Co. 20 6 established troublesome precedent by the court's reliance on the
Restatement bomb throwing illustration. The factual scenario set
forth in that illustration describes an intentional tort. It demonstrates a specific intent to kill B, with the injury to C being sub198. 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993).
199. 42 F.3d 1386 (1994), released in full-text at No. 94-1598, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34397 at *1.
200. No. 93-341-CIV-5-BR, slip op. (E.D.N.C. April 22, 1994).
201. No. 3:93 CV 00014, slip op. (M.D.N.C. May 14, 1993).
202. No. 91-125-CIV-4-H, 1993 WL 122307 at *1 (E.D.N.C. March 22, 1993).
203. "Based on defendant's answer and clincher agreement which stated the
injury was accidental, the burden then shifted to plaintiff to present a forecast of
evidence to support her claim that the injury was also the result of an intentional
tort committed by defendant employer." Owens, 113 N.C. App. at 327, 438 S.E.2d
at 442 (1994).
204. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. at 239, 424 S.E.2d at
395 (1993).
205. See, e.g., Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 364, 148 S.E.2d 289 (1994);
Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 115 N.C. App. 624,446 S.E.2d 369 (1994); Powell v. S
& G. Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 442 S.E.2d 143 (1994).
206. 114 N.C. App. 319, 442 S.E.2d 143 (1994).
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stantially certain to follow under the circumstances. This
principle is more analogous to the concept of transferred intent to
20
injure an otherwise innocent bystander or unintended victim

7

and is not applicable to the Woodson substantial certainty standard, where no intent to injure is required. 20 8 The Powell decision
is pending before the North Carolina Supreme Court on appeal of
right based on Judge Wynn's dissent.
Since the court of appeals has not been analyzing substantial
certainty claims by checking the presence of the four elements, it
is not surprising that in only the Mickles v. Duke Power Co. 209
case has the plaintiff survived summary judgment. In Mickles,
the particularly strong facts evidencing the extreme danger of roll
out and the defendant's knowledge of the danger creates a good
case for satisfying the intentional injury exception. Thus, when
the court applied the bomb throwing standard, the plaintiff's case
survived under the guise of a substantial certainty analysis.
Likewise, too much emphasis has been placed upon whether
federal or state safety violations were issued for the accident. In
Echols v. Zarn, Inc.,210 although plaintiff alleged the company
breached internal safety policies, the court stated that no governmental safety regulations were breached and affirmed judgment
for the defendant.2 1 ' In Zocco v. United States,212 although the
plaintiff alleged the defendant's knowledge of regulatory noncompliance, the court appears to have resolved this issue in favor of
the defendant because no violations were actually issued.2 13 Making out a prima facie case for substantial certainty does not
require showing breach of government safety regulations. Furthermore, a company's voluntary adaptation of safety regulations
certainly evidences at least an equal knowledge of a danger as
with those dangers eventually discovered and regulated by the
government.
The remarks in Owens suggest the court has recognized these
misapplications of the substantial certainty standard. The Powell, Mickles and Echols cases are currently pending before the
207. North Carolina has long recognized the concept of transferred intent to
injure. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 415 S.E.2d 726 (1992).
208. See generally Woodson, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222.
209. 116 N.C. App. 364, 448 S.E.2d 289 (1994).
210. 116 N.C. App. 364, 448 S.E.2d 289 (1994).
211. Id. at 379, 448 S.E.2d at 297.
212. 791 F. Supp. 595 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
213. Id. See also Reed, No. 93-341-CIV-5-BR, slip op. (E.D.N.C. April 22,
1994).
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North Carolina Supreme Court on appeal. In light of the confusing and erroneous treatments given to substantial certainty
claims by the lower state and federal courts, it would be wise to
evaluate these cases anew following an elemental approach. In
this manner potential claims would be evaluated under legal standards which are applicable to many situations, rather than by the
limited factual comparisons employed by the courts thus far.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court carved out a limited
exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act when it adopted the substantial certainty standard of liability in Woodson v. Rowland. Since then, the courts have
struggled to identify a bright line test for determining when a case
meets the substantial certainty standard of liability. The federal
courts have adopted buzz word tests, such as the "intervening act"
analysis in Reed, the "random act" test in Mitchell and the "Woodson factors" balancing rationale in Hodge. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has settled on the Restatement's bomb throwing
illustration.
Along the way, the attempt to use these bright line tests has
created confusion. The factual analysis of Woodson and the Barrino dissent required by substantial certainty has evolved into a
factual comparison between the case under review and the Woodson case. A more appropriate analysis would consider the four
elements of substantial certainty separately and identify the facts
which support each element. Erroneous reliance on inconsequential facts, such as safety law violations, would decrease. This
approach would lead to a uniform application of the doctrine
rather than a rigid limitation of the substantial certainty standard to the facts presented in Woodson.
All in all, too much emphasis has been placed on the Woodson
facts, too little emphasis on the Barrino facts, and very limited
discussion of the elements of the claim has occurred. The combined effect of the reported decisions is that the substantial certainty standard of liability remains in a state of substantial
uncertainty. The supreme court's Owens addendum takes the
first step towards clarifying the doctrine. Decisions in the Powell,
Mickles and Echols cases should complete the process.
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